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1997 was Hong Kong's year By any standard it was a remarkable event to wit-
ness the tr田 sfer of sovereignty of the last remaining Bnt1sh possession m Asia to血e
newly emerging superpower of China The moment that confirmed the success of 
this shift occurred in December 1997 when Tung Chee-hwa made his way to Be1img 
to肥portto the SAR’s masters on developments smce the hand-over on I July. As he 
left Hong Kong to fly north, Tung told reporters：‘I will be the問 tomake a ful report 
to President Jiang Zemin and Pnme Minister Li Peng about al that has happened 
since July l, al that on economic, financial, hvehhood issues as well as futu陀 deveト
opments.'"' Tung, as the日目tchief executive of the Special Administrative Region 
of Hong Kong, was intent on makmg it crystal clear both to the peoples of Hong 
Kong and the mtematwnal community at large that the process of transfening and 
consolidating Chinese sovereignty could now be regarded as completed Tung was 
followmg in由elong established回bu阻rytradition N白血erhe nor Hong Kong could 
be under any illusions over Hong Kong’s new pohtical realities All had gone ac-
cordmg to China’s script Its leadership could rejoice.印
In a brief paper it is impossible to do justice to more than a few of the features of 
Hong Kong’s transforrnat10n in 1997 Space precludes litle but a cursory note on 
items worthy of entire monographs, while readers should perhaps also be reminded 
of the severe scientific constraints imposed on al who attempt‘mstant history' We 
do not yet know -and we may never know much of the thinking behind Chma’s 
collective leadership on how and why particular decisions were made. Detatls, for 
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example, of the assumed !mks between the SAR and Beijing during the severe日nan
c1al crisis that hit the Hong Kong markets in the autumn of 1997 are unlikely to be 
forthcoming, particularly as both parties have been at pains to deny even unofficial 
discussions in the immediate a白ermathof speculative moves to alter the value of the 
Hong Kong dollar."1 Even more sensitive questions, such as discussions over the 
deployment of armed Chinese military forces withm Hong Kong immediately after I 
July 1997向 andthe issue of re岨mingseve問 restrictionson border controls between 
由eSAR and Chma proper will be unknown unul such time as one or more members 
of由eChmese politbureau finds 1t convement to distribute rival versions of these 
events to interested parties outside the inner power Clfcle. 
Central to the change of sovereignty for Hong Kong was, of course, the decades 
of discussion between Britain and China over how this could best be achieved. By 
January 1997 most issues had been resolved-as might have been expected given that 
London and Be1jmg had first agreed on 'the question of Hong Kong' m thelf Jomt 
Declaration of September 1984.1'1 Although the world’s media spent the last months 
prior to the actual ce問momesassociated with the handover concentrating on the 
minutiae of these diplomal!c squabbles, it had long been app訂・entprior to 1997 that 
the田 couldbe httle that would stand m the way of Beijing, if it wished to emphasize 
its ultimate control over such issues Concerns of Bntain, the United States and other 
interested powers might at times mfluence the PRC, but no one, particularly within 
Hong Kong, felt that outsiders had many cards to play in the final days of British 
rule US Secretary of State Madeleine Albnght, for example, might note that how 
China behaved over Hong Kong following the transfer of sovereignty would be ‘very 
important to the overall relationship’between her country and Chma, but this was 
easier said than done,161 The United States did indeed profess at length its involve-
ment in monitoring the activities of the soon to be born SAR and the Clinton admm-
istration appe町edmore prepared to state pubhcly its anxieti田 thanthe government 
of John Ma1or in London over possible penalties for China’s noncompliance with its 
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treaty obligations towards post-reverSJon Hong Kong. Yet this provided litle but 
cold comfort to many within the te汀itoryFew had aoy illuSJons that曲eauthorities 
in Beijing had田tamedthe ultimate right to run their returned acres as they deemed 
fit Few mSJde Hong Kong needed aoy particularly sophisticated awareness of the 
p出tbehaviour of the Chmese government to doubt that sanctions and the use of fa陀e
would be applied, if and when necessary to obtam compli叩cewt由Itscommand. 
The mfinitely long arm of Chinese state power was best seen in the appointment 
ofTung Chee-hwa as Beijing’s chosen son for running Hong Kong. Tung was widely 
viewed as bemg permanently mdebted to the PRC through its earlier financial in-
volvement m savmg his family's shippmg empire from bankruptcy; 1t followed m-
ev1tably that there would be litle opportunity in the opinion of al but the most com-
mitted party supporte四 toenvisage the possibility of the日間tchief executive of Hong 
Kong bemg prepa田dto stand up for his ward in defiance of Beijing. Once Tung 
Chee-hwa was elected on 11 December 1996 as the hand-picked representative of 
Chma m a process that took place outside the temtory, it was difficult to foresee 
much prospect of any further measures towards a mo田 openpolitical system within 
Hong Kong. The hopes of those advocates of a democratic future for Hong Kong 
were largely destroyed even before Tung took of日ce'" 
Tungw田 notto disappoint his bosses m Beijing His election was determined by 
China and his policies since 1 July must be assumed to have been crafted at every 
stage with, at the very least, the near total awareness of the PRC’s likely response 
The writing was on出ewall once Tung announced that after reversion, the Chinese-
sponso目dProvisional LegISlatu問 wouldinstantly replace the elected LegCo (LegIS-
lauve Council) that had been installed by Governor Chns Patten following the Sep-
tember 1995 elections Tung’s dilemma was certainly unenviable but 1t has to be said 
由athe appeared more interested m protectmg his sponsors than阻kingthe mitiative 
to attempt to discover a posSJble compromise between the PRC’s camp and the vocal 
supporters of Martm Lee and the Democratic Party. 
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Tung admilledly dtd hold discussions with Lee but litle common ground was 
established Tung made itplain曲目China'sintended Provisional Legislature would 
not be dismantled or even be subject to alteration. He spoke publicly旬 alopponents 
of the PRC’s scheme that it would be best for these critics to desist from further 
a11acks, asking‘those who constantly speak il against the provisional legislature to 
the west to stop doing so for the sake of Hong Kong’s 6 3 mtllion people.’Tung 
continued’＇It's a complicated issue and 1f1t's not understood properly, it would 
mislead people’凹This,of course, was tantamount to saying that Beijing knew best 
and that the peoples of Hong Kong must realize this new reality as quickly and to-
tally as possible. From the perspecttve of Tung’s alies in the business community 
the chief executtve-elect was seen as making pre口selythe type of speeches that it 
had hoped for. Equally satisfied were the Beijing cadres. Smee their“One Country . 
Two Systems" approach had never envisaged the desirability of dISsent in the印刷re
SAR, they we四 undoubtedlypleased that Tung appeared to be fulfilling what inter-
nal CCP documents had the previous year defined as the key criteria on selectton of 
their puppet同 Talkswith Hong Kong’s Democrats were part of the PRC’s tradi-
ttonal united front approach to al groups that might potentially be persuaded to co-
operate, but this was clearly understood to be without alteration to the official party 
lme. Appeals to Chinese palnotISm would normally be expected to play a prominent 
role in any such discussions."" 
Martm Lee, however, was no! about to be bought off by these tactics Long be-
fore Hong Kong’s transfer of sovereignty he had demonstrated a岡田consistencym 
openly cntic1zmg both Britain and China over their joint handling of the territory’s 
affairs. Lee, for example, stated publicly w1曲目24hours of Governor Patten’s Octo-
ber 1992 speech outlimng his refonn package that the British authorities were stil 
too cautious m血目rapproach to Hong Kong. Lee told the Foreign Correspondents 
Club that he regarded Patten’s proposals as・AcompromISe…nothing more and 
nothing les. 叩＂ By1997 Lee was undoubtedly dis1llus1oned with the pace of politi-
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cal reform and the total mtransigence on the part of the Chmese author山esto even 
曲目limitedadvance towards constitutional change Yet, in October 1992 Lee had 
been prepared to admit that‘If we have the Court of Final Appeal, sufficient democ-
racy阻 dfreedom of由epress we should feel p田tysafe叩＂， but by May 1997 he w出
complaining of being‘abandoned by the British government, by the US govern-
ment, by any government叩めTheyears of campaigning and arguing had clearly 
taken their tol. He reacted叩＇grilyto earlier comments by Sir Percy Cradock, former 
British ambassador to Beijing and adviser on Hong Kong thereafter to the Thatcher 
government, that‘Hong Kong people must wake up and be prep町edto sacnfice 3% 
of their freedom to preserve the other 97%. Pursue this logic further, I suppose 1t 
also in our interest to lose 50% or even 97% of our freedom to preserve the litle 
3%.’t附
For Martin Lee and his supporte四 thelast months of colonial rule were a disturb-
ing t描【eof what would follow after 1 July I 997. He contmued to speak out against 
the Chin田eleadership, daring to say that thelf concept of individual rights was a 
travesty L回目白sedto accept China’s stance that there should be‘only one human 
nghtおrthe Chinese people . the nght to hve and be fed. I don’t cal that a human 
right. I cal it an animal right.'"" For Lee由e問問mainsno distinction between Asian 
values and W田ternvalues over曲目rcommon commitment to respect for individual 
freedoms and the rule of law. Hong Kong, in Lee’S view, ought to be seen as an 
examplera由erthan a threat Beiimg should therefore learn to emulate the behaviour 
of the futu目 SARand recogmze that‘if we can continue to be free and have the rule 
of law四dpartial democracy, we will be a very good model for Chinaη＂1 Lee feared 
that the Beijmg leadership had no understanding of the importance of maintaining 
the SAR’s freedoms. The Chinese authorities ‘believe they can take away some civil 
hberties and we will be al right, so Jong as we continue toe町oyeconomic freedom 
They believe they can put a noose around the neck of the goose, that it will stil lay 
golden eggs.’Lee continued ・‘Then they will tighten the noose more and more be 
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cause it is in the communist blood to wish to control everything.巾＂ Yet Lee had to 
admit that few others within the Hong Kong commumty were prepared to convey 
this type of message to Beijing. He asked : 'How many people have been telling由e
Chmese leaders it doesn’t work, please don’t kil the goose -or , atleast, if you keep 
that noose町oundits neck, there will be no more golden eggs People don’t say this 
to China. How can it be that you can separate economic freedom from political free-
dom？’【問
Lee’S highly exposed position was admirable. His public cnt1c1sms of the PRC 
阻dTung Chee-hwa left nobody in doubt of his political stance on the likely poht1cal 
prospects for Hong Kong L田 wascareful to expr田ssome sympathy for Tung m the 
summer of 1997, by nothmg that‘Mr Tung is a nice guy. I have no doubt of hts 
integrity, but what can he do? He was chosen by Beijing. Deng Xiaopmg said, many 
years ago, about Chma -when there 1s a good system, even evil men cannot do evil. 
But when there is a no-good system, even good men cannot do good, but may be 
forced to do evil’Lee feared therefore that‘Mr. Tung is a good man who may be
forced to do evil because he hasn’t got this democratic system to back him up 叩例
There was indeed evidence m Hong Kong during 1997 that strongly suppo此.ed
Ma此mLee’s thesis. F<己町Sfor the continuation of the fonner territory’s political町司
rangements centred on possible restrictions to accepted freedoms of both speech and 
assembly and by the very existence of the PRC’sown provisional legislature.''" Amidst 
accusations and counter charges it was generally felt that attempts we田 bemgmade
to limit ex1stmg democratic righ臼.Reuter's, for example, reported from diffe問nt
correspondents within the territory that Tung in Apnl 1997 was intent on tummg 
back the clock over curbs on demonstrations and foreign fundmg of political p町－
ties''" Such measures, 1t was acknowledged by Michael Suen, seconded to Tung’s 
transition team by the Hong Kong overnment, were considered necessary because 
of Beijing’s insistence that, in its frequently voiced op1mon, Governor Patten had 
been guilty of senous recent infringements of the Smo-Bntish Joint Declaration出｝
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China had long held that由ePatten admmistration was determmed to press ahead 
with democratization measures m order to create post-reversion mstability and that 
al such new laws deserved to be scrapped Michael Suen argued that 'We must 
strike a balance between civil hbert1es and social stability, personal nghts and social 
obligations, individual mterests and the common good.’凹＇Healso st田ssedthat‘In 
working out the proposals, we adhere to the principle that they must be in ful com-
pliance with the Basic Law and consistent with the provisions of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.代＂＇Few,however, in the te町itoryneeded 
much reminding of the Chmese record on human rights."" 
More serious, however，出an出1sissue was the question of how elections were to 
be a町・angedto replace the puppet Provisional Legislatu問 Hereit was app町ent出at
the SAR and the PRC were equally determmed to retreat from the electoral system 
inherited (and then much derided) from Governor Patten. His hopes that such ar-
rangements might survive the transfer of power were seen to be widely optimistic 
long before the actual handover. MaロinLee could only complain at what he cor-
rectly出回目.edwas a retrograde step He said in June 1997 that his Democratic Party 
、NOuldinevitably・loseThat is designed to be the case’U匂Leeheld that the Chi・
nese authorities and the SAR‘want to make sure that when an election is (held) 
a呂田n,my Democratic Party, which won 65 percent of the popular vote in the last 
election in 1995, will end up getting less than one-quarter of the seats.’＂ Despite 
such anx1el!es over the planned 1998 elections, most international comment on Hong 
Kong’s first months after colonial rule was positive. The British government’s for 
e1gn secret町ypraised China for回spectingits agreements over the transfer，問while
the U.S House of representatives taskforce on the SAR was equally positive m its 
mitial reaction to出etransition ＜却〉
Pohtical disputes over 印刷reelectwns were not, however, at出ecentre of public 
mterest m Hong Kong during 1997 More immediate concern had to be faced by由e
new three-legged stool of the untried SAR adm1mstration, the ultimate powers in 
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Beijing and the divided citizens of the former territory To the su叩riseof most com-
mentators, it was to prove to be economic and financial issues that dominated debate 
throughout the year The first six months of 1997 saw boom like conditions; the 
remainder of the year quickly put a severe damper on the SAR’s optimistic begin-
nings It was, as the Far Eastern Economic Review rightly noted in its analysis of 
events, indeed the case that the 'greatest th問atto Hong Kong’s well-being since the 
handover has come not仕・omChma but from the wash of the cuπency turmoil that 
rocked Southeast Asia. ’It continued・‘TheHong Kong Monetary Authority suc 
ceed吋mweathering the speculative attack and maintainmg the local currency’s link 
to the U.S.dollar. The HKMSA’s success was due as much to Hong Kong’s hard-
currency肥田何回asto solid fundamentals, including a welトregulatedbanking and 
financial system, transparency and free flow of infom】ation町四Somewould un-
doubtedly question the accuracy of parts of this analysis but the Hong Kong au由on-
ties could denve a de耳目eof satisfaction surely in having survived this inilal storm 間
It was certainly a baptism of fire 
The crudest 11lustra!Ion of Hong Kong’s cuπent economic difficulties 1s to com-
pare the prices on the stock m町ketover the year. This has always been seen as a 
benchmark of Hong Kong’s prosperity by both its successive administrations and the 
man in the street. In January 1997 the Hang Seng index stood at 13,500 but twelve 
months later it was叩 lyat 10,300. At one p副 icul町lyperilous junc刷rein November 
1997 1t had slid 阻止000 and there were concerns of a free fal into unmapped and 
highly dangerous tradmg zones. Clearly 1997 was a most disappointing one for Hong 
Kong’s stock markets as a result of the financial chaos brought about initialy由rough
property speculation in Thailand and then spreading to Indonesia and South Korea 
In January 1998 the Tokyo stock exchange recorded a two and a half year low of 
14,664.＇羽田 1fto remmd mternat1onal mv田曲目thatthe entire Asian Pacific region 
remamed vulnerable to what the p問ssenjoyed describing as “Asian contagion 川33)
The lessons for the Asian-Pacific region have yet to be fully digested but it is gener 
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ally assumed由atboth internal and mtemat10nal問おrmswill be necess町ytop阻 vent
future crashes 
Whtie commentators has long assumed that the Chinese money that had flown 
mto the Hong Kong stock and property markets m the months pnor to reversion 
would inevitably dry up over time, there was httle immediate concem for what proved 
to be a traumatic period The crash of 1997 8 w田 neitherthe result of Western mach1-
nations nor of Chinese retrenchment, mstead, it was the product of regional eco-
nomic factors over which Hong Kong proved to be almost helpless It was a salutary 
lesson indeed of the vulnerability of the SAR and the new global realities of mtema 
t10nal finance Twenty four hour markets and instant electronic communications 
忠rnranteethat the opportunities and d四 gersof an田onomicand financial structure 
出 openand transpa陀ntas Hong Kong’s isinevitably hable to both larger gams and 
potential losses than the mo田 controlledmarkets of other states in the region. The 
difficulti田 appe紅・edf訂 E陀aterin 1997 than ant1c1pated, but 1t must be st田ssedthat 
Hong Kong’s very existence h田b田npremIS吋byfre markets and an open economy. 
Any substantial retreat from these ideals would almost certainly lead to the long-
term demise of the city state.<'4> Laissez-faire could not be replaced by an interven 
tionist administrative system; ASia is ful of developmental states but Hong Kong’s 
road to riches has been paved by different gods If Hong Kong’S ideology were 
changed, it would Simply self destruct. 
Hong Kong’s prospects in 1997 appeared satisfactory when出eyear began. Real 
GNPm出emid-1990shad b田na highly respectable 5.0%開閉dthe economy S田m吋
set for a respectable showmg as the BritISh prepared to leave the temtory Yet the問
were clearly identifiable warnings already on the honzon that neither the colomal 
authonties in Hong Kong nor mtemat1onal commentators attempted to ignore. By 
the begmmng of 1997 the temtory faced worsening unemployment, unsustamable 
property prices and severe inflation.＇地 While曲目efactors even in combination did 
not p回sagea recession, it was generally accepted由atthere would need to be some 
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corrections by the government, once the celebrations were over. Unfortunately for 
the new authorities and the SAR，出chandoverof Hong Kong coincided with what in 
September 1997 was al肥adya loss of vigour, as Southeast Asia was reported to be 
'gnpped by currency problems which have forced up domestic interest rates and 
promISe白rtherdisappomtments in economic growth. ’＂ Whether itwas coinciden-
阻lor not, It deserves to be noted that the massive devaluations of the問gionalcuπen-
(38) 
cies began literally days before the reversion of Hong Kong to the PRC To my 
knowledge, this pomt has not yet been commented upon or addr，田sedin the available 
lite回同reon the political economy and international田lationsof current Asia 、/Vhathappened to Hong Kong’s economy m 1997 was partly the consequence of 
a large number of adverse regional factors and partly the product of official and 
private sector decisions within Hong Kong Initially, it appeared that the newly born 
SAR would escape由eturmoil of Southeast Asia and, as if to underline the stabihty 
of Hong Kong, the World Bank held its annual meetmg the四 mlate September. The 
world’s med悶悶portedin confident tones that‘Hong Kong's economy rem創nsbuoy-
ant, helped by handover euphoria and easier credit in mainland China’問andthat the 
fundamentals for the new city state were strong. The SAR W田 described田 sittingon 
an mherited‘a cash mounta田市仰audthe stock market appeared able to power ahead 
on the China factor, whereby“red chip”stocks were eagerly bought by mvestors 
confident of the Chmese government's endorsement."" Much of this tradmg frenzy 
waspu田lysp田ulative,however, and it ought to have been obvious that latecomers 
were taking considerable risks "" 
Yet the mev1table downturn was far severer than forecasters had generally ex-
pec阻止ithad not been built into share prices or property values and therefore pro-
duced greater fals once the Southeast Asian impact was recognized in September 
and October 1997. Within months of the handover the new authorities were tested to 
the limit by external crises and domestic on田ー Thecollapse of Peregrine Investment 
Holdmgs on 12 January 1998 symbolized the rapidity with which the SAR found 
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itself alone in a hosllle international financial environment将司HongKong’s largest 
indigenous mv田tmenthouse failed through its alleged arrogance and unwillingness 
to produce adequate accounting delails. European and American companies refused 
to save Peregrine when it discovered its overextended position in Indonesia＇叫 The
demise of Peregrine was a clear warning to al and sundry that Hong Kong’S situa-
tmn was not intrinsically different仕omits southern neighbours The stock market 
fel 774 points (8 7%) on the news."" 
More senous, though less sensational than曲efal of Peregrine, was what did not 
happen to Hong Kong dollar’s fixed peg with US cuπency Despite the competitive 
devaluations of 1997 elsewhere in the region and in South瓦orea,the Hong Kong 
authonties and the PRC government田fusedto alter the fixed Hong Kong dollar rate 
against the US dollar. It quickly became an article of faith for the Tung administra 
tion that the value of the local dollar would not be alte問d.To do so would have had 
huge問percussionsfor the SAR and indeed for China’sown economic and financial 
pohc1es. Whether it made good sense to insist on retaining such an overvalued cur-
rency was disputed by economists but the final decision, one must assume, was po-
litical and made m Beijmg This, of course, was not how Donald Tsang explamed his 
role, yet it stands to reason that only the Chmese cadres could detennine appropnate 
pohcy for Hong Kong’s cuπ・ency.＜・哨Toa large degree China could avoid what was 
happening m Hong Kong and the悶＇gionbecause of s回ctgovernmental controls that 
largely insulated its economic system from the tunnoil Most international financ回目
took the view by 1998 that Chma had behaved correctly in not addmg to Asia’s 
troubles, through some insist that such rectitude can not last as the PRC economy 
slows down from 8% per annum growth to somethmg more modest.仰 1Obviously, 
出elengthenmg of China’s dif日cultiesmust impact on Hong Kong as 1t thrives on its 
middleman position between the PRC and the outside world 
Hong Kong ended 1997 m great uncertainty Its role as a safe haven for capital 
was in question, i岱propeはysector was severely damaged and its tourist industry had 
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been mauled by a combination of high prices and bad publicity.同＞Inaddition, it has 
in the next months t。問ckonwith sensitive P。liticalchanges as 1 organizes its自rst
post-reversion elections. '1 The admimstration。fTur】EChee-hwa h出品unditself in 
a senes of uncomfortable positions曲目evena vastly more experienced government 
would hate Hong Kong can not escape, it must attempt，出inthe past, to weather the 
storms and hope for calmer seas by century’s end. 
(1) Tung Chee-hwa quoted by Reuters, l口heDaily Yomiuri, 10 Deeember I 997 
(2) As the preamble to the B田ieLaw of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of The 
People’s Republic of China stated, the PRC will日sume‘theexercise of sovereignty over 
Hong Kong with effect from 1 July I 997，出usful日Hingthe Jong cherished common晶pト
ration of the Chinese people伽 the即 overyofHong Kong.’Basic Law of HK SAR, adopted 
by the Seventh National People’s Congre" at its Third Session on 4 April 1990, (Hong 
Kong, I 992). 
(3) The issue of sources』shardly new The British government operates under a‘thirty year 
rule’for the release of its files and the Hong Kong Public Records Office used to ope悶【.eon
a somewhat similar scheme 
(4) For one averse剖 viewentitled 'China plans military display at HK handover' see Financial 
Times (front page〕，2I November 1996. The st。ryw国 clmlyb"'ed on British government 
sources and noted that People’s Liberation Army forces would form ‘a natural and ex 
pec<ed part of ceremomes surro叩 ding叩 eventof such momentous sovereign 1mpo尻町ce’
(5) For the text s田 BuckleyHong Kong: the road to 1997 (Cambridge, 1997) pp. I 87-194. 
(6) Albright qu凶edin the Australian, 30 January 1997 
(7) No common ground w田 everfound between Governor Patten’s belief that the franchise 
could be g回allywidened w1thm Hong Kong and the PRC’s insistence that Patten’s mea-
sures we問 ablatant violation of the Anglo-Chinese Joint Declaration It was this issue 
above al else that strained relations between London and Beりmg.
(8) Financial Tim自ら 10January 1997. Hong Kong’s colonial administrat10n had in the past 
used similar arguments on the necessity of preserving stability at al costs within the teri 
tory; it too had until rece剖Jybeen extremely wary of any introduction of representative 
government. 
(9) See Willy W←Lap Lam, South China Morning Post, 6 June 1996.百 esecritena were‘lofty 
mo悶1lity;ability to strike a balance among the interests of financial and bus in国sgroups (in 
Hong Kong), abihly to handle the civil serv』ce;and ability to maintain good relations with 
the central author』ties.’Seealso Steve Tsang Hong Kong An Appomtment with China 
(London, I 997) 
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(IO）百1'PRCW田 coocernedb叫hto 問ducepolitkal oppo,ition within the SAR and, probably 
of even greater importance, p胞vent山euse of Hong Kong as a base for pot開tialysubver・ 
sive ideas and actions reaching China proper Contamination of the PRC by Hong Konge凶
with polittcal links to the 、Westhad been vividly underhned in the days followmg the 
Tiananmen massacre 
(ll) Lee asrepo巾 dby Karl Wilson m The Correspondent (Hong Kong, FCC) (November 
1992). Lee was bmer at the w剖 teof time that had already lapsed during GovernorW1lson's 
yea回目。fficeLee noted that ‘The Government and Britain had its chance when Lord 
Wilson took over. They never bothered. What Patten should have done was to say OK 
Hong Kong’S going to have ful democracy and then spend the next four years t可ingto 
convince China that it IS a good thing. ’Wtlson had been governor from April 1987 until 
succeeded by Chris Patten m July 1992, followmg Patten’s loss of his parliamentary seat in 
the Bntish general election. 
(12) ;bM. 
(13) Los Angels Times，悶prmtedin The Daily Yomiuri, 12 May 1997. This revealing interview 
was conducted by Nancy Yoshihara 
(14) ibid. Lee asked 'Why should we give叩 anything?lsn’t that the re,ponsibility of the 
British government to make su田 thatIt doesn’t happen? lsn’t that, likewise at least, the 
moral obligat10n of your govemmenトtosee that it doern’t happen? So, of course, I feel 
abandoned’. See also Percy Cradock Experiences of Ch白川London,1994) 
(15) ibid. Lee could be equally scathing of other states that he also saw as le" than committed 
to democ岡田valuesHe said that Tung・d碑 Snot admire (S皿gapo問、fonnerPrime Min-
ister). Lee Kuan Yew, but he adores him. ’Lee viewed Smgapore as an inappropriate model 
for Hong Kong. S田 reportby Yumiko Miyai, The Daily拘miuri,21June1997. 
(16) ibid. 
(17) ibid. 
(18) ibid. On the paucity of academic investigation into Hong Kong’s political cultu田 priorto 
1997 see Fred Y L. Ch叩‘Politic'and the Body Social in Colonial Hong Kong', Pos1tian5' 
四st削除culturescritique, vol. 4, no 2, fal 1996. 
(19) ibid. 
(20)L由、Dem叫問tsdecided to boycott the provisional legislatu田 andexpelled the one mem-
ber who broke ranks and JOmed. See letter from Frank Ching of the Far Eastern Economic 
Review in Foreign Affairs (November 1997). 
(21)‘HK’S Tung launches plans to curb post-97 fr,田 dom’，Reuter’s,9 April 1997. 
(22) ibid. 
(23) ibid. 
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香港返還・英国植民地から中国特別行政区へ 1997年1月～12月
く要約〉
ロジャー・ノてックレイ
1997年は香港の年であった。それは英国直轄植民地香港の統治権が中国
に返還された歴史的瞬間が証明している。
現在，香港は中国の特別行政区であり，その特定地域における自治以
上のものは所有していない。
1997年1月以降の出来事が示すように香港は北京を敵に固さず，健全な
経済状態のもとでしか生き残れないであろうロ 1997年香港の経済的地位は
悪化した。しかしながら制限された政治的自治権は傷つけられていない。未
だ解決されていない経済危機を評論家達は予測出来なかったのであろうか。
